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Abstract
This paper presents a model allowing to analyze voting, welfare in-
stitutions and economic performance. We consider a political economy
framework with three classes of agents: entrepreneurs, employed work-
ers and unemployed workers. Agents vote on alternative institutional
options: the degree of labour market flexibility and the intensity of
redistribution. We show that the welfare state configuration depends
on the nature of the political system - majoritarian, coalition, two-
party. Because internationalization reduces the possibility for national
government to eﬀectively tax profits, the existing political coalition is
fragilized by the process of globalization. The model generates results
concerning the macroeconomic equilibrium employment level. Hence
we can assess the eﬀects of internationalization on macroeconomic per-
formance. The impact of internalization depends on the nature of the
political system (majoritarian versus coalition government) and on the
institutional configuration (positive flexibility versus positive redistri-
bution).
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to develop an integrated framework to analyze voting, wel-
fare institutions and economic performance. More particularly, we focus on
the political economy of labour market institutions and income redistribu-
tion in a context of globalization.
Labour institutions and income redistribution are two main pillars of the
welfare and social security systems. Indeed, Bertola and Boeri [2002] sub-
mit that the trade-oﬀ between income protection through redistribution, and
employment protection through legislation crucially shapes national welfare
states. Following the seminal work by Cameron (1978), trade and capital
market integration is traditionally seen as a driving force increasing eco-
nomic volatility and insecurity, thus motivating the need for insurance pro-
vided by the welfare state (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). It has also been
acknowledged that internationalization induces pressures to undermine na-
tional social security systems (Rodrik, 1997). First, globalization threatens
the role and strength of national regulations on job protection; second, eco-
nomic actors holding mobile assets - such as capital - find themselves in
a more comfortable position to exit national jurisdictions, thereby forcing
policy makers to compete to preserve the national tax basis (Swank and
Steinmo, 2002). We aim to propose an analytical framework encompassing
those issues.
Two streams of literature mainly deal with issues related to welfare and
social security systems: the economics and the political economy literatures.
The former traditionally investigates the consequences of social security in-
stitutions on economic performance (see for instance Bertola et al., 2001;
Nicoletti et al. 2001; Nickell and Layard 1999). Bertola and Boeri [2002; p.
5] restate the equity-eﬃciency dilemma by submitting that "broadly speak-
ing, labour market institutions that protect workers against unfair market
developments unavoidably reduce the intensity of competition as they trade-
oﬀ lower productive eﬃciency against ex ante distributional equity". Hence,
there would be a fundamentally perverse eﬀect of equity improving institu-
tions on economic performance. Following the process of European integra-
tion, economists have recently shown a renewed interest toward the analysis
of the evolution of welfare state institutions (see Andersen, 2003; Bertola
and Boeri 2002; Bertola et al. 2001).
The political economy literature studies the evolving support for welfare
policies stemming from interested voters (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). In
this respect, one crucial question is the multiplicity of welfare and social
security models. Following the seminal contribution by Esping-Andersen
[1990], Amable [2003] provides a review of existing taxonomies as well as an
empirical analysis confirming the variety of welfare state models: the Scan-
dinavian, the neoliberal, the continental European, the South-European and
the Asian models. At the heart of recent and past changes in welfare state
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institutions, political factors explain the varying size of the welfare state
across countries. First, political institutions and namely the administrative
strength and institutional cohesion of a state, are considered to be crucial to
explain the more or less important development of the welfare state (Crepaz,
1998). Crepaz [1998, p. 63] notes that "the more political power is dispersed,
[...] the higher will be the representativeness and capacity of governments to
respond to diﬀuse welfare state issues". Second, political economists tradi-
tionally point to the crucial role of political partisanship in explainaing the
expansion of the welfare state as well as existing diﬀerences across national
configurations. Following Korpi and Palme [2003, p. 425], alternative wel-
fare state configurations can be seen as the outcomes of conflicts between
socioeconomic interest groups and that "in these distributive conflicts parti-
san politics is likely to matter". Amable, Gatti and Schumacher [2005] show
that the pattern of welfare state retrenchment, observed in most developed
countries during the 1990s, is significantly related to the partisan position
of the government coalition.
Existing contributions in economics (Andersen, 2002; Milesi-Ferretti,
Perotti and Rostagno, 2002; Persson, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 1998)
suggest that the main factors explaining the generosity of national welfare
state institutions are: the features (i.e. variance and skewness) of the pre-
tax income distribution, the volatility of income, and the characteristics of
political institutions i.e. presidential versus parliamentary and majoritarian
versus proportional voting systems. However, few papers have attempted
to bridge the gap between the political economy literature -dealing with
the role and functioning of political and institutional systems- and the eco-
nomic literature studying the determinants of macroeconomic performance.
Persson, Roland and Tabellini [2003] attempt to analyze in an integrated
setup the electoral system, government coalitions and economic policy. The
authors’ main result points to a link between the nature of the electoral sys-
tem (majoritarian versus proportional) and the size of government spending.
However, the paper does not address the issue of macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Saint Paul [2001] provides an analysis of the political economy of
labour market institutions and their impact on employment. The political
process studied by the author portrays several economic groups (such as em-
ployed and unemployed workers) taking decisions over institutional reforms.
These reforms are carried out on a single dimension, for instance job pro-
tection legislation. The political process itself does not allow for coalition
and strategic interactions between the economic groups.
Our paper proposes a framework to analyze the impact of voting on
welfare institutions and economic performance. The model features three
socio-economic groups that interact and vote on several dimensions of the
social security system at a time. Because the three groups have intrinsi-
cally contradictory preferences over the welfare state configuration, actors
need to build a political compromise. The process by which a compromise
3
emerges is a matter of political exchange between socio-economic groups.
This includes the possibility of engaging in coalitions ensuring the majority
of votes. Hence, the nature of the compromise crucially depends on the
features of the prevailing political system: a majoritarian system yields a
political equilibrium that is radically diﬀerent from a coalition government
system.
To analyze the process of compromise formation (and the associated po-
litical equilibrium), we develop a political economy framework based on a
recent model proposed by Pagano and Volpin [2001]. Pagano and Volpin
[2001] study the political economy of corporate governance in a three ac-
tor economy: entrepreneurs, workers and rentiers vote on two institutional
dimensions, investments protection and job protection. Their model allows
for the possibility that actors negotiate over alternative institutional options
and form coalitions. As a consequence, the final political consensus will not
necessarily correspond to any individual actor’s first best.
We modify and extend Pagano and Volpin’s framework to study the
compromise concerning welfare state institutions that can emerge among
socio-economic actors, and the way this compromise is modified following
the process of internationalization. More specifically, three classes of actors
will be considered: entrepreneurs, employed workers and unemployed work-
ers. Alternative institutional options are identified by two parameters: the
degree of labour market flexibility (regulation) and the intensity of welfare
redistribution through taxes and benefits. Hence a vote on two institutional
variables takes place, namely the proportion f of workers that can be fired
according to legislation and the tax rate r determining wages and profits
taxes. Our assumption is that internationalization makes it easier for firms
to evade taxes thus reducing the size of national tax basis. The process
leads to a modification of the political compromise and weakens existing
coalitions.
In the next section, we present the basic set-up of the model. Section
3 outlines the preferences of each group of agents. Section 4 studies the
political equilibria resulting from coalition formation and discusses the out-
come in reference to known models of social security systems. The following
section investigates the links between the political equilibrium and economic
performance. Section 5 considers a particular case where there are two par-
ties competing for votes. A final section concludes the paper and considers
possible extensions.
2 Basic framework
Our model features three groups of economic actors: entrepreneurs, em-
ployed workers and unemployed workers. There is a fixed number F of
entrepreneurs. F is large enough so that there is competition among firms.
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The total population is normalised to 1 + F with F < 1. Entrepreneurs
can only manage a firm, and workers can only be employed or unemployed.
Each entrepreneur manages a firm; all firms have an identical production
function which uses labour as its sole input. N represents the number of
employed workers. Workers have incentives to provide an eﬀort level equal
to 1 with a utility cost of e; at time t the value of labour productivity is
yt. Real wage rigidities due to an eﬃciency wage mechanism (see Section
5.1) generate equilibrium unemployment; Nu is the number of unemployed
workers as well as the unemployment rate (in fact N +Nu = 1).
We consider that actors’ political decisions are driven by economic mo-
tives; based on their utility and profit functions, workers and entrepreneurs
express their preferences over alternative institutional options - i.e. various
degrees of job security and welfare redistribution. Hence, economic actors
need to take decisions in both the economic and the institutional dimen-
sions. To help understand how these two dimensions interact in our setup,
we follow Pagano and Volpin [2001] and consider a simple multiperiod model
encompassing two production cycles, which allows us to consider job flows
in and out of unemployment.
The exact time line of our model is as follows:
t = −1 : employment contracts are signed determining wages w1 and w2
and employment level N ;
t = 0 : a political decision is taken on two dimensions, namely the degree of
job security (1− f) and welfare redistribution (r);
t = 1 : initial output is produced, initial wages w1 and unemployment
benefit b1 are paid;
t = 1.5 : productivity shock occurs; employment flows (firing and hiring)
take place;
t = 2 : final output is produced, second period wages w2 and redundancy
indemnities δ2 are paid.
Employment contracts are signed at t = −1 stating wages and the em-
ployment level. This stage sets up the political groups and determines their
respective size. In the following period, political groups strike their institu-
tional decisions through a voting process on two institutional parameters:
the proportion f of workers that can be fired at time t as well as the tax rate
r on wages and profits. After voting, the first production cycle comes to an
end. At time t = 1.5, a shock takes place which makes a proportion 1 − d
of employed workers less productive - for instance by making their compe-
tence obsolete. Firms would like to get rid of unproductive workers to hire
new personnel1. This can be done only up to a proportion f , fixed by law.
Hence, the flow out of employment at time t = 1.5 equals N · (1− d) · f . Af-
1The implicit assumption here is that unemployed workers hold more up-to-date com-
petence than unproductive workers. This is a common simplifying assumption in the lit-
erature on labour turnover.
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ter workers reallocation has taken place, the second production cycle comes
to a end.
Taxes are paid at time t = 1, 2 and used to finance unemployment benefit
b1 and redundancy indemnities δ2. At each period the balanced budget
constraint holds; hence the size of benefits is endogenously determined at
time t = 1, 2 by the following equations:
Nu · b1(r) = T 1e (r) + T 1f (r) (1)
N · (1− d) · f · δ2(r) = T 2f (r) (2)
where T tf (r) = taxes paid at period t = 1, 2 by f irms and T 1e (r) = taxes
paid at period t = 1 by employed workers. Workers contribute to financing
unemployment benefits but redundancy indemnities are entirely financed by
firms.
The model will be solved by backward induction. After presenting utility
and profits functions, we study political decisions at time t = 0 and then
the macroeconomic equilibrium at time t = −1.
2.1 workers utility
Define U te the utility at time t of an employed worker. We assume that
unemployment benefits are paid only for one period at t = 1 for first-period
unemployed. This assumption corresponds to the empirical evidence that
unemployment benefits are generally limited in time. The utility of a one
period unemployed worker at time t is U tu. A worker who was unemployed at
period 1 and stays unemployed at period 2 is not entitled to any additional
benefit. His utility at time 2 is U2ltu and is equal to zero.
Recall that a shock takes place at time t = 1.5 making a proportion
1− d of employed workers less productive. Hence, each worker faces a posi-
tive probability of losing his job. This probability depends on the job secu-
rity legislation determining the size of employment adjustements admitted
by law: firms can fire only up to a proportion f of less productive work-
ers. Workers who are fired after the productivity shock obtain redundancy
indemnities δ2(r).
Utilities at time t = 1 are determined as follows:
U1e =
w1 − r ·W − e+
[d+ (1− d) · (1− f)] · U2e + (1− d) · f · U2u (3)
U1u = b1(r) + a · U2e + (1− a) · U2ltu (4)
w1 is the wage paid at t = 1, e is the eﬀort level provided by the worker
and a is the hiring rate. W is the maximum wage tax that can be taken
out of wage income, i.e. corresponding to a tax rate r = 1. We choose
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this expression for taxes out of simplicity reasons. The wage tax is non
distortive, but its amount is chosen by voters, through the choice of r. We
will suppose W exogenous in the following. Hence, total wage tax revenues
T 1e (r) are equal to N · r ·W .
The hiring rate is such that the flow equilibrium condition holds at time
t = 1.5. One has:
a ·Nu = f · (1− d) ·N (5)
The utility of workers hired (U2e ), fired (U2u) and long term unemployed
(U2ltu) at time t = 2 are the following:
U2e = w2 − e (6)
U2u = δ2(r) (7)
U2ltu = 0 (8)
2.2 firms profits
Let V 1 be the value of a firm at time t = 1. This value is given by the net
output per worker πt of both production cycles at time t = 1, 2. It includes
profit tax costs as well as employment reallocation flows at time t = 1.5:
V 1 = (π1 + π2) · NF (9)
π1 = yH −w1 − (1− ε) · r · T
π2 = [d+ (1− d) · f ] · (yH −w2) + (1− d) · (1− f) · (yL − w2)− (1− ε) · r · T
As in Pagano and Volpin [2001], yH is the productivity level of highly pro-
ductive workers, yL is the level of low productivity workers. For the first
production cycle, every worker has the high productivity level. Following
the shock that takes place at t = 1.5,a proportion 1 − d of the workers
becomes less productive, i.e. their productivity level falls to yL. T is the
maximum tax revenue out of profits, corresponding to r = 1. We suppose
W < T . The tax on firms acts as an employment tax so that total tax levied
on profits is proportional to employment.Profit tax revenues T tf (r) at time
t = 1, 2 are N · (1− ε) · r · T.
The parameter ε measures the intensity of internationalization, which
makes possible for firms to evade such taxes. Following Avi-Yonah [2000],
we consider that the current age of globalisation may be characterised by
an increased mobility of capital, both as a result of technological change
(the ability to move funds electronically) and the relaxation of international
capital controls. This has implication for tax competition and tax revenues.
Countries lower their personal and corporate tax rate in order to attract
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foreign funds, which unleashes a race to the bottom in terms tax rates. At
the same time, firms established on an multinational base have better op-
portunities to shift profits in order to take advantages of tax competition.
Bartelsman and Beetsma [2000] report that a unilateral increase in the cor-
porate tax rate leads to a more than oﬀsetting decline in reported profits
and thereby in corporate tax basis. In its 22nd Report to the President,
the French Tax Council reports that firms’ reaction to the tax competition
induced by globalization is not so much to move capital and relocate pro-
duction units, but to keep production in their original locations and merely
shift profits to places where the tax rates are the lowest (Conseil des im-
pôts [2004]). Therefore, internationalization and the ability to levy tax on
corporations are linked.2 We simply represent this link with the help of
the parameter ε. An increase in internationalization allows firms to evade
taxation, so that for a given tax r · T , only a fraction (1− ε) is actually
paid. Our model will allow us to deduct the consequences of this possibility
oﬀered to firms for taxation decided within the country.
3 Political preferences of socio-economic groups
Political preferences at time t = 0 are determined by the values of employed
and unemployed workers’ utility and firms’ profit at time t = 1. Because
wages are set at time t = −1, they are taken as given at time t = 0 when
political choices are made. Hence, in this section and the following we
analyze the political decisions for given values of wages w1 and w2. Section
5 will present the wage setting process and the macroeconomic equilibrium.
3.1 employed workers
To determine employed workers political preferences, we have to go back
to equation (3) defining workers utility at time t = 1. By substituting
equations (2), (7) and (6) into (3) and taking account of the definition of
tax income, one obtains an expression for workers utility at t = 1 as a
function of institutional parameters f and r. Hence, political preferences
are simply determined by the partial derivatives of U1e with respect to the
two institutional parameters. One has:
2The relationship between globalization and corporate tax rates is established from an
empirical point of view as stated for instance by Swank and Steinmo [2002]. However, the
same authors provide empirical results supporting the idea that the eﬀective rate of tax
on capital would be much less sensible to the degree of internationalization. See Swank
and Steinmo [2002] for an appraisal of the literature underlining the debate between those
who support and those who oppose the "globalization theory".
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∂U1e
∂f
= − (w2 − e) · (1− d) < 0 (10)
∂U1e
∂r
= (1− ε) · T −W
½
> 0 if ε < 1− WT
< 0 if ε > 1− WT
(11)
Workers are generally opposed to flexibility. In other words, they appre-
ciate labour market regulation protecting existing jobs and thus reducing
the probability of being fired. Regarding taxes, one can see that the inten-
sity of internationalization determines employed workers’ preferences over
redistribution. When internationalization is weak, firms’ profits are more
easily taxed and firms contribute largely to redistribution. Hence, workers
can benefit from unemployment benefits in case of firing without having
to support the entire burden of compensation transfers towards the un-
employed. As internationalization becomes stronger, firms’ profits become
more volatile and the profit tax base shrinks. The burden of redistribution
falls more heavily on workers who eventually become opposed to taxes and
redistribution.
3.2 unemployed
Political preferences of unemployed are determined by their utility at time
t = 1 i.e. by equation (4). Again, one has to substitute equations (1),
(6) and (8) into (4) and take account of the definition of tax income. This
yields an expression of unemployed utility that depends only on institutional
parameters. The unemployed political preferences are determined by the
sign of the partial derivatives of U1u with respect to f and r . One obtains:
∂U1u
∂f
= (w2 − e) · (1− d) · NNu > 0 (12)
∂U1u
∂r
= [(1− ε) · T +W ] · N
Nu
> 0 (13)
Unemployed workers generally appreciate labour market flexibility i.e.
low regulation. In fact, flexibility allows for larger flows on the labour mar-
ket thus increasing the probability of job finding.3 The unemployed unam-
biguously support taxes as they serve to finance redistribution through the
unemployment benefits scheme.
3One should note that this is a partial equilibrium result, obtained for given values of
wages and employment. The macroeconomic result is much more complex and is derived
in Section 5 and following.
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3.3 entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs’ political preferences are determined by the firm’s value at
time t = 1. This value is given by equation (9). The partial derivatives with
respect to f and r can be written as follows:
∂V 1
∂f
= (yH − yL) · (1− d) · NF > 0 (14)
∂V 1
∂r
= −2 · (1− ε) · T · N
F
< 0 (15)
Firms’ value increases when labour market regulation is less strict. In
fact, this allows firms to get rid of a larger proportion of less productive
workers at time t = 2. Entrepreneurs thus favour flexibility. Entrepreneurs
are generally opposed to taxes as they are asked to contribute to redistrib-
ution, without directly benefiting from it.
3.4 divergent political preferences
We summarize our results on political preferences in the table below.
f r
workers − +/−
unemployed + +
entrepreneurs + −
Table 1 : political preferences
Workers are opposed to labour flexibility as a group because they have
to choose a degree of employment protection not knowing whether their
productivity level will be high or low during the second production cycle.
Every worker has a positive probability of having a low productivity and
runs the risk of being fired if no legal employment protection measures
are implemented. Ex post, high productivity workers would be indiﬀer-
ent with respect to employment protection since they would not be under
the threat of redundancy. But low-productivity workers would press for
a maximum employment protection. Ex-ante, the average worker would
vote for this maximum protection. The unemployed are opposed to employ-
ment protection for opposite reasons. Their only chance of finding a job
is that low productivity workers should be fired. The easier it is for firms
to lay oﬀ workers, the higher is the unemployed’s probability of finding a
job. In this case, their interests are perfectly in line with those of firms,
who would wish to replace low-productivity workers with high-productivity
unemployed. But unemployed and firms’ interests are exactly opposite as
far as taxation and redistribution are concerned. Taxation is a mere cost
for firms, which decreases profits and brings no benefits. For unemployed,
it is a source of income since unemployment benefits are financed through
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taxation. Therefore, entrepreneurs would vote for a zero-rate of taxation,
whereas unemployed would choose the maximum rate.
The preferences of workers with respect to taxation and redistribution
are ambiguous. Taxation is a sum taken oﬀ their wage income, and on
this count, they are opposed to it. On the other hand, tax income finances
redundancy indemnities which they might claim should their productivity
level lead to their dismissal before the second production period. And since
tax revenues come from both wage and profits, their benefits will not be en-
tirely financed by them. However, the possibility for firms to evade taxation
-thanks to internationalization- makes it more diﬃcult to finance benefits.
When the tax evasion possibilities are high, the profit tax base is very small
and the bulk of tax revenues comes from wages. In this case, workers do not
find it worthy to finance the unemployed of the first period since the benefits
they might claim, during the second production period, will be financed by
the profit tax alone, which will yield very little. Therefore, there exists a
threshold degree of internationalization above which workers are opposed to
taxation. Under this threshold level, the profit-tax base is large enough to
make workers accept to finance the benefits of first period unemployed and,
in return, have their own benefits financed by the profit tax revenues.
In what follows we will restrict ourselves to the case where workers favour
redistribution, i.e. ε < 1− WT .
4 Voting and coalitions
The political preferences characterized above shape the political decisions
of socio-economic groups, which in turn determine the degree of flexibility
and redistribution, i.e. the institutional setting.
Political decisions are taken on the basis of a voting process. The out-
come of voting is determined by the majority of voters - i.e. the choice that
collects the support of two classes out of three. We exclude the possibility
of an unemployment rate so high that the unemployed could be a majority
of voters by themselves, i.e. Nu < 1+F2 . We also exclude the case where
workers can by themselves achieve a majority, that is 1−Nu < 1+F2 .4 Ac-
tors may either vote on each single institutional dimension in turn (disjoint
vote) or on both institutional dimensions at a time (joint vote). This second
political system favors the emergence of coalitions among diﬀerent classes
having opposite preferences. These coalitions determine a political issue
that configures an ”institutionalized compromise”.
A critical parameter to understand the outcome of the political process
is internationalization, measured by ε. In fact, the intensity of international-
ization determines employed workers preferences concerning redistribution.
When intensity of internationalization is not too large, i.e. ε < 1 −W/T ,
4See Appendix for parametrical conditions.
11
workers are in favour of redistribution: ∂U
1
e
∂r > 0. In this case, the result of a
majority vote is as follows: workers and unemployed vote for redistribution;
entrepreneurs and unemployed vote for flexibility. Hence, the institutional
setting is characterized by a flexible labour market complemented by a sys-
tem of compensation transfers towards the unemployed. This is the outcome
preferred by the unemployed.
4.1 insiders coalition
The majority vote leads to a configuration preferred by the unemployed,
while workers and entrepreneurs are only partially satisfied. Employed work-
ers and entrepreneurs can try to improve their respective welfares by forming
a coalition. The coalition is only possible when the political system allows
for the possibility of a joint vote on an ”institutional platform”, i.e. on the
two institutional parameters at a time. If this is the case, a coalition can be
formed with workers and entrepreneurs fixing through a bargaining process
the values of the institutional parameters f an r - which will then be subject
to a vote.
To avoid cycling in voting, we consider, as in Pagano and Volpin [2001],
that coalitions are formed once and for all. The political process can be
represented as a four stage process: at stage 1 a coalition is formed by any
two social groups, any group can participate to at most one coalition - if
no coalitions are formed stage 4 follows; at stage 2 the coalition presents its
proposal concerning institutional setting, each coalition presenting at most
one proposal - if no proposal is presented stage 4 follows; at stage 3 social
groups take a "yes or no" vote on the proposal according to a majority rule,
if the proposal is accepted the political game is over - if no agreement is
reached stage 4 follows; at stage 4 a disjoint vote takes place.
To verify that a coalition is indeed possible one should check the relative
slope of workers and entrepreneurs indiﬀerence curves. Given their political
preferences, it is clear that the two indiﬀerence curves have a positive slope.
A coalition can be formed if it ensures a utility level higher than the majority
vote outcome {f = 1, r = 1}. Figure 1 below portrays a situation where a
coalition is possible.
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Figure 1. Entrepreneurs and workers indiﬀerence curves
Workers’ and entrepreneurs’ respective utilities increase in the directions
given by the arrows in Figure 1. As it can be seen, for a coalition to be
possible the entrepreneurs indiﬀerence curve should be more sloped than
the workers indiﬀerence curve. This condition is indeed always satisfied
in our model. In fact, the ratio of the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves
(entrepreneurs/workers) is given by:
2 · T · (w2 − e) · (1− ε)
(yH − yL) · [(1− ε) · T −W ] > 1
because5 yH − yL < w2 − e and (1− ε) · T −W < 2 · (1− ε) · T .
4.2 institutional setting
The institutional parameters are fixed according to a bargaining process
within the coalition. As Pagano and Volpin [2001], we assume that the result
of such a bargaining is characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. Given
that the outside option is the utility associated to the majority vote outcome
{f = 1, r = 1} , the objective function of the coalition is the following:
S = (1− φ) · ©Log £U1e (f, r)− U1e (1, 1)¤ª+ φ · ©Log £V 1 (f, r)− V 1 (1, 1)¤ª
(16)
where φ represents the bargaining power of entrepreneurs within the coali-
tion.
The values of f and r are fixed by maximizing the above objective func-
tion. It can be shown that in our model the solutions are at the boundary,
5Condition yH − yL < w2 − e is necessary to ensure that firms are not willing to get
rid of their entire workforce (in spite of regulation) by assuring compensation transfers to
workers that can not be fired. This would be possible if the gain in terms of increased
productivity is higher that the cost of the compensation transfers. To make voluntary
departs possible, these transfers should be equal to the second period utility of employed
workers, i.e. w2 − e.
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with either r or f equal to zero: if ∂S∂r = 0 then
∂S
∂f < 0 and f = 0; if
∂S
∂f = 0
then ∂S∂r < 0 and r = 0.
This yields two alternative sets of solutions, S1 and S2:
S1
(
f = 0
r = r∗ = 1− 12 · (1− d) ·
h
(yH−yL)·(1−φ)
(1−ε)·T +
2·(w2−e)·φ
(1−ε)·T−W
i
S2
(
f = f∗ = 1− T ·(1−ε)·2·(w2−e)·(1−φ)+[(1−ε)·T−W ]·(yH−yL)·φ(w2−e)·(yH−yL)·(1−d)
r = 0
One can show that dr
∗
dε < 0 and
df∗
dε > 0. Internationalization therefore
leads to a modification of the institutional setting supported by the coalition,
leading to more flexibility and less redistribution. The rationale for this
result is that an increase in ε corresponds to an increase in the outside option
of entrepreneurs, i.e. the value of the firm associated with the institutional
configuration corresponding to the majority vote. In fact, in that case the
tax rate is at its maximum. Because an increase in ε leads to more tax evasion
by firms, the gain (in terms of lower taxation) from internationalization is
relatively higher when the tax rate is high. This process continues up to
the point where internationalization is suﬃciently strong to modify workers
preferences concerning redistribution.
Moreover, it can be shown that dr
∗
dφ < 0 and
df∗
dφ > 0. Therefore, the
impact of an increase in entrepreneurs bargaining power is similar to inter-
nationalization.
1 
1 
r*
f* 
f 
r 
Figure 2. Consequences of increased internationalization and/or increased
bargaining power of entrepreneurs
4.3 diﬀerent models in perspective
The political equilibriums emerging out of the model give three possible
institutional configurations.
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4.3.1 the ’flexicurity’ model
This configuration associates labour market flexibility and redistribution:
f = 1 and r = 1. Such an equilibrium emerges when there is a majoritar-
ian political system and corresponds to the unemployed’ first best. Such a
combination has been dubbed ’flexicurity’ (Esping Andersen, 2002; Visser
et Hemerijck, 1999) in the case of Northern European economies such as the
Netherlands or Denmark. This setting is held to combine the qualities of
easy labour market adjustments with those of a high social protection. Our
model shows that this configuration is only viable if globalisation forces are
not too strong (ε < 1− WT ). Otherwise employed workers vote against redis-
tribution and the majoritarian system leads to a neo-liberal configuration
with full labour market flexibility and no redistribution f = 1 and r = 0.
4.3.2 the ’Anglo-saxon’ model
This configuration combines labour market flexibility (f = f∗ > 0) and
no redistribution (r = 0) and can be associated with the ’Anglo-saxon’
economies (USA, UK).6 The degree of labour market flexibility depends on
the diﬀerent parameters of the model, particularly the bargaining power of
firms. It may be noted that labour market flexibility increases with global-
isation.
4.3.3 the (South-)European model
Some degree of labour market rigidity associated with some redistribution
is a characteristic of European economies (Amable, 2003). North European
economies generally favour a high degree of social protection through re-
distribution rather than labour market flexibility. Countries like France or
Germany (the continental European model) are less generous with respect
to redistribution, but protect more employed workers. The case of a high
degree of job protection and a limited redistribution corresponds to South
European countries such as Spain. In this respect, the last possible config-
uration of our model, which combines labour market rigidity (f = 0) with
some redistribution (r = r∗ > 0), is close to the South-European model.
Increased globalisation leads to a drop in the amount of redistribution.
5 Economic equilibrium and performance
In this Section, we consider the macroeconomic equilibrium with endogenous
wages at time t = −1. One again, we restrict our attention to the case of
weak internationalization, i.e. the case where workers are favourable to
taxation and redistribution (ε < 1− WT ).
6See Amable [2003] for a characterisation of the market-based neo-liberal model.
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5.1 eﬃciency wages
We endogenize the determination of the wage rates for each production pe-
riod. We suppose an eﬃciency wage mechanism à la Shapiro and Stiglitz
[1984]. Working involves an eﬀort cost e for the worker, who has a pos-
sibility to shirk. A shirking worker is caught with probability p and fired
immediately.
Let us first determine the eﬃciency wage for the second production cycle.
Since production stops after this cycle, a worker caught shirking during the
second production period ends up unemployed with no further chance of
getting another job. Denoting by U2us the utility of a fired shirker, we can
express the equations describing the value of shirking at t = 2:
U2es = (1− p) · w2 + p · U2us
and the value of not shirking:
U2ens = w2 − e
A worker fired for shirking does not obtain any redundancy indemnity,
therefore U2us = 0. We may then deduce the eﬃciency wage for the second
production period:
we2 =
e
p
We can now turn to the wage rate for the first production period. The
utility of a shirker can be expressed by the following equation:
U1es = (1− p) ·
½
w1 − r ·W + [d+ (1− f) · (1− d)] · U2e
+f · (1− d) · U2u
¾
+ p · U1u
One can note that a shirker fired during the first production cycle is
entitled to the benefits paid to every unemployed worker (b1); his utillity is
thus equal to U1u . The utility of a nonshirker is:
U1ens = w1 − r ·W − e+ [d+ (1− f) · (1− d)] · U2e + f · (1− d) · U2u
Taking account of the fact that benefits and redundancy indemnities
are financed by tax income according to (1) and (2), and recalling that
N +Nu = 1, we obtain the eﬃciency wage for the first production period:
we1 =
e · [f · (1− p) · (1− d) + p ·Nu] + p · r · [W + T · (1− ε) · (1− 2 ·Nu)]
p ·Nu
(17)
One can see that the eﬃciency wage increases with labour market flex-
ibility f . An increased f is equivalent to a rise in workers turnover, which
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diminishes the value of being employed, thus decreasing incentives to provide
the adequate level of eﬀort. In order to oﬀset such an eﬀect, the eﬃciency
wage ought to be raised. The eﬀect of the tax rate r is positive when the
unemployment rate is under 50%. This is due to the fact that the tax rate
determines the generosity of the unemployment benefits and redundancy
indemnities. Increased benefits going to the unemployed increase the value
of being unemployed thus decreasing incentives not to shirk. Hence, here
again the eﬃciency wage must rise. Internationalization ε pushes the ef-
ficiency wage downwards because it reduces the tax base and the level of
unemployment benefits.
5.2 zero profit condition
Since the number of firms is fixed, there is no free entry condition that
would drive profits to zero. However, as long as there are positive profits,
firms are willing to increase their labour force. Hence, competition among
firms will push up labour demand and thereby wages to the point where
the equilibrium wage corresponds to a profit level equal to zero, under the
constraint of the eﬃciency wage. We can use this condition to derive an
expression for the wage rate of the first production period compatible with
a zero profit condition:
wZP1 = (1 + d)·yH+(1− d)·[(1− f) · yL + f · yH ]−2·r ·T ·(1− ε)−
e
p
(18)
wZP1 decreases with r but increases with f and ε.
5.3 employment
We can derive the level of equilibrium employment by crossing the eﬃciency
wage schedule and the zero profit condition. Because (17) and (18) also
depend on the institutional variables f and r, employment will depend on
the outcome of the political process and of the bargaining process within
the coalition.
5.3.1 case 1. flexicurity
This case corresponds to the majoritarian outcome with r = 1, f = 1. The
unemployment rate is easily derived and equals:
Nu =
(1− d) · (1− p) · e+ p · [T · (1− ε)−W ]
2 · p · yH − e · (1 + p)
It should be noted that 2 · p · yH − e · (1 + p) > 0 given the parametrical
restrictions that we consider below (case 3). Globalization has a positive
eﬀect on employment as long as ε < 1− WT . However, an increase of ε below
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this value will imply a change of the majoritarian political equilibrium and
the associated unemployment rate.
5.3.2 case 2. positive flexibility
This scenario corresponds to the solution S2 with r = 0, f = f∗. We
can compute the value of the eﬃciency wage we1 with r = 0 and f = f∗.
Taking account of the expression of we2 and rewriting (17), we can deduce
an expression for the unemployment rate Nu (w1, ε) .
Nu =
e · (1− p) · [(1− d) · (yH − yL)− 2 · T · (1− ε) · (1− φ)]
−p · (yH − yL) · [T · (1− ε)−W ] · φ
p · (w1 − e) · (yH − yL)
One can check that ceteris paribus, an increased ε pushes the unemploy-
ment rate up:
∂Nu
∂ε
> 0
One can also easily check that ∂Nu∂w1 < 0. Since in equilibrium w1 = w
ZP
1 ,
which depends only on ε, we obtain the equilibrium value of the unemploy-
ment rateNu (ε). The eﬀects of an increase in ε on the rate of unemployment
can be assessed:
dNu
dε
=
∂Nu
∂w1
· dw1
dε
+
∂Nu
∂ε
Since ∂Nu∂w1 < 0,
dw1
dε > 0 and
∂Nu
∂ε > 0, there is in principle an indeter-
minacy. However, one can show that the sign of this derivative depends on
the sign of the term yH · (1 + d) + yL · (1− d) − e · 1+pp . As the analysis of
case 3 will show, in order to have an equilibrium this term must be positive.
Hence, an increase in internationalization leads to a rise in unemployment.
5.3.3 case 3. positive redistribution
This case corresponds to the set of solution S1 with r = r∗, f = 0. We can
compute the value of the eﬃciency wage we1 and the zero-profit wage wZP1
with r = r∗ and f = 0. One can check that:
dwZP1
dε
=
∂wZP1
∂ε
+
∂wZP1
∂r
· dr
dε
> 0
dwe1
dε
=
∂we1
∂ε
+
∂we1
∂r
· dr
dε
< 0
because drdε < 0,
∂wZP1
∂ε > 0,
∂wZP1
∂r < 0,
∂we1
∂ε < 0 and
∂we1
∂r > 0 as long
as the unemployment rate is lower than 50%. This leads to a situation
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where increased internationalization pushes firms labour demand upward
and the eﬃciency wage schedule downward, which yields a positive impact
on employment as shown in Figure 3.
w 
u 
Figure 3. Impact of increased internationalization
One should note that the sign of dNudε is that of
h
e · 1+pp − yH · (1 + d)− yL · (1− d)
i
.
Because we know from Figure 3 that dNudε < 0 we conclude that the sign of
this term must be negative.
5.4 discussion
The results above suggest that increasing globalization aﬀects in a diﬀer-
ent way the institutional configurations corresponding to the three social
security systems (see Figure 4).
Concerning flexicurity (case 1) and positive redistribution (case 3, close
to the South-European model), globalization yields fiscal restraint by re-
ducing the corporate tax base; in case 3 this is associated to a negotiated
reduction in the level of the tax rate. This evolution corresponds to a process
of "social dumping" leading to a weakening of the redistributive role of the
welfare state. The eﬀects of such a process on employment are positive.
The reason is that taxes bear a the negative impact on labour demand, and
unemployment benefits increase the eﬃciency wage level. Fiscal restraint
and weaker redistribution are thus associated with higher labour demand
and lower eﬃciency wage. We suspect that such results might be sensitive
to changes in the setup of the model. In particular, redistribution mat-
ters more for economic performance if one takes account of the unemployed
human capital and of the quality of job matches.
Concerning the positive flexibility scenario (case 2), globalization leads
to an increasing level of labour market flexibility, which yields a negative
impact on employment. The reason is that job security acts as an incentive
device thus allowing to lower the eﬃciency wage schedule. Hence, increased
flexibility creates real wage pressure, which may lower aggregate employment
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(see Amable and Gatti, 2004). This result points to one possible weakness
of the Anglo-Saxon model of markets deregulation.
 
 
C ase 3  
N eo-libera l 
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C ase 1  
C ase 2  
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Figure 4. Eﬀects of globalization on employment and social security in the
three cases
6 Political equilibrium with two-party competi-
tion
We have considered so far situations where the agenda of each party was
suited to specific interest groups. We now turn to the situation where two
parties compete for votes. Each party has no definite platform and modifies
its oﬀers to voters according to what program is more likely to attract voters.
Probabilistic voting allows to escape from the problems associated to multi-
dimensional voting (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Each party is uncertain
about the preferences of the voters, for instance because individual voters
may abstain from voting for parties with platforms too far away from their
ideal points. The expected number of votes is a smooth function of the
policy platform. Parties are labelled 1 and 2. Voter i belonging to social
group J (J = F,W,U) will prefer party 1 to party 2 if:
UJ1 > UJ2 + σiJ + ξ
where UJ1 is the utility of any member of group J if party 1 wins, and UJ2
the utility of the same group if party 2 wins. σiJ is an individual-specific
parameter uniformly distributed over
h
− 12·φJ ,
1
2·φJ
i
, φJ > 0 is a group spe-
cific parameter. ξ measures the average relative popularity of party 2 in
the population as a whole. This parameter too can take positive as well as
negative values and is uniformly distributed over
h
− 12·ψ ,
1
2·ψ
i
, ψ > 0. Given
those assumptions, the vote share of party 1 is given by:
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p1 =
X
J
αJ · φJ ·
µ
σJ +
1
2 · φJ
¶
where αJ is the relative share of group J in the electorate and σJ charac-
terises the ’swing voter’ in group J , i.e. the voter whose bias makes him
indiﬀerent between the two parties. Therefore, the probability that party 1
wins the election is given by:
Π1 =
1
2
+
φ
ψ
·
X
J
αJ · φJ ·
¡
UJ1 − UJ2
¢
where φ =
P
J αJ · φJ is the average density across groups.
In equilibrium, each party chooses the same platform, and thereby oﬀers
the same utility levels to each social groups. Maximising Π1 (or Π2) with
respect to r and f gives the platform oﬀered by the two parties. One can
check that:
dΠ1
df
> 0⇔ φF · (yH − yL) + (φU − φW ) · (w2 − e) > 0
dΠ1
dr
> 0⇔ T · (1− ε) · (φU + φW − 2 · φF ) +W · (φU − φW ) > 0
dΠ1
df is always positive when φU ≥ φW ; it tends to stay positive when φW is
not too large. In this case, the outcome is that parties propose labour market
flexibility. This outcome is not surprising considering the preferences of each
group with respect to flexibility. Only workers are against it. Parties are
more likely to propose employment protection if workers’ voting behaviour
becomes more uncertain, that is if they become a ’swing group’. If φW
is very high, this means that the group of workers is ’ideologically’ more
homogeneous and has a large number of swing voters.This makes the group
itself more attractive for the parties, which therefore target their platforms
towards the interests of this group.
The decision regarding redistribution depends on the extent of ’global-
isation’, ε, and on T and W . In our setting, ε < 1 − WT . this means that
dΠ1
dr increases with both φU and φW and it decreases with φF . Here again,
an increase in homogeneity of a group tends to tilt party platforms towards
the interests of this group. The impact of ε on party choices depends also
on groups homogeneity. dΠ1dr increases with ε when
φU+φW
2 < φF , i.e. when
the average density of workers and unemployed is lower than firm owners’
density.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a model formalizing the link between the politi-
cal system, the political power of socio-economic groups, the institutional
configuration of the welfare state, and macroeconomic performance. We
have considered three social groups - employed workers, unemployed work-
ers and entrepreuneurs- having diﬀerent political and economic interests.
Social groups can aﬀect the institutional framework - i.e. labour market
flexibility and income redistribution - through a political process leading to
voting.
Our main results show that the welfare state configuration is aﬀected
by the nature of the political system - majoritarian, coalition, two-party.
A majoritarian system is characterized by an welfare state configuration
associating a flexible labor market and a maximum level of redistribution.
A coalition system features an ”insiders” coalition (employed workers plus
entrepreneurs) sustaining either positive flexible (and no redistribution) or
positive redistribution (and no flexibility). Finally, the two-party system
gives political power to the ”swing voters” group.
We have also studied the impact of internationalization on the politi-
cal equilibria. Internationalization enables firms to take advantage of fiscal
trade-oﬀ thereby reducing the possibility for national government to eﬀec-
tively tax profits. The model shows that the insider coalition is fragilized
by the process of internationalization. In fact, this process reduces the re-
sources available for redistribution as well as the margins for the political
exchange within the coalition.
The model generates results concerning the macroeconomic equilibrium
employment level. We can therefore assess the eﬀects of internationaliza-
tion on macroeconomic performance. The impact of internationalization
depends on the nature of the political system (majoritarian versus coali-
tion government) and on the institutional configuration (positive flexibility
versus positive redistribution). In particular, we show that in the case of
positive redistribution the internationalization process lowers the intensity
of redistribution thus increasing labour demand and employment; in the case
of positive flexibility, internationalization reduces job security thus creating
real wage pressure and lower employment.
8 Appendix
To make sure that the unemployment rate is not so high that the unemployed
could be a majority of voters by themselves, we consider that Nu < 12 . We
also exclude the case where workers can by themselves achieve a majority,
i.e. Nu > 1−F2 .
1. Flexicurity
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1−F
2 < N
∗
u < 12
N∗u =
e ·(2−d· (1−p))+p· [T ·(1−)+W−2· yH ]
e·(1+ p)−2 ·yH ·p
2. Positive flexibility
1−F
2 < N
∗
u < 12
N∗u =
e· (1−p) ·{(yH−yL)· p· (T · (1−)−W )·φ+e· (1−p)·[2·T · (1−)· (1−φ)−(1−d)· (yH−yL)]}
(yH−yL) ·{2· e· (1−p)· p· (T ·(1−)· (1−φ)−yH)+(yH−yL)· p2· (T · (1−)−W )·φ−e2· (1−p2)}
3. Positive redistribution
1−F
2 < N
∗
u < 12
N∗u =
p · (T · (1− ) +W ) ·n
1− (1−d) ·(1−f)· [2· e·T · (1−)·φ·(1−p)+p ·(T · (1−)−W )· (yH−yL)·(1−φ)]2· p·T · (T · (1−)−W )· (1−)
o
[yH ·(1+d)+yL·(1−d)] ·p−e· (1+p)
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